As the Internet of Things (IoT) industry continues to grow networked devices are beginning to be used in many applications (e.g., across enterprises, medical applications, automobiles, smart cities, authentication for banking, and physiological health monitoring). Due to the private and critical nature of many of these applications, it is necessary that secure data transfer be implemented. For example balancing privacy, safety, and security is key in the health industries, particularly for implantable medical devices and body area networks. While there has been significant research exploring software enabled security measures and physiological values as an input to cryptographic keys, these systems may still be vulnerable to adverse parties. Despite software and cryptographic keys, an adverse party may threaten security and privacy by eavesdropping on wireless communications at the telemetry interface or by actively jamming, replaying, modifying, forging, or dropping wireless communications.
For example, FIG. 1 is a schematic of a body area network 172 that may be susceptible to intrusion by an adverse party 176. The body area network 172 may include a plurality of components 171 that are communicatively coupled to a telemetry interface 173. The components 171 may include physiological sensors (e.g., heart rate monitors, thermometers, perspiration sensors, etc.) or medical devices (e.g., pacemakers, insulin pumps, hearing aids, etc.). The telemetry interface 173 may transmit data 178 from the components 171 to a programmer 174 and receive commands 179 from the controller 174. The data 178 and the commands 179 may be transmitted over any wireless network, such as the internet or a local area network. As described above, these communications may be susceptible to eavesdropping and/or interference 177 by an adverse party 176. In the case of physiological sensors and implants, this intrusion may be particularly harmful since malicious signals may be sent to critical implants and result in unnecessary therapeutic treatments (e.g., a malicious signal may be sent to the telemetry interface 173 that results in a pacemaker 178 delivering a shock to the user's 170 heart when no cardiac event has taken place). While the particular instance of an adverse party 176 intruding into a body area network 172 is illustrated, it is to be appreciated that the communications between any networked devices may be intercepted in a substantially similar manner.